

Property-Based and Contract-Based Design of System Architectures

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ES
EMBEDDED
SYSTEMS

Credits

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Outline

1. Introduction and motivations
2. Infinite-state model checking
3. Properties specification languages
4. Contract-based design with temporal logics
5. OCRA tool support

First Part:

Introduction and motivations

A tutorial on property-based and contract-based
design of system architectures

Model-based system engineering

- ✧ **Models** used for system requirements, architectural design, analysis, validation and verification.
- ✧ Different system-level analysis (safety, security, performance, ...).
- ✧ Top-down refinement process.
- ✧ Software/hardware co-engineering.
- ✧ Definition of the platform and deployment.
- ✧ Applied to **embedded systems**:
 - Interaction with physical world (continuous time).
 - Real-time constraints.
 - Complex interaction of many components:
 - Sensors, actuators, monitors, communication links.

Formal methods as back-end

Formal methods

- **Formal specification** languages
 - Assign models a mathematical meaning
 - Different property languages for different model semantics
- **Formal verification** to prove the properties on the models.

Verification flow:

- Design models translated into input for verification engine:
 - Typically a (meaningful) subset is considered
 - Automatic translation preserving semantics of properties of interest
- Requirements formalized into properties
 - This is typically a manual process.
- Results mapped back to the design flow.

This tutorial will focus on:

- **Model checking** [CGP99] techniques for a wide spectrum:
 - Finite states vs. infinite states
 - Discrete time vs. hybrid/continuous-time.
- **Properties** languages in the different cases.

Component-based design

- ∞ A **component** is a unit of composition with contractually specified interfaces [Szy02].
- ∞ Components are the constituent parts of a system architecture.
- ∞ Sub-components interact through connections.
- ∞ They are seen as black box for proper
 - Compositional verification.
 - Reuse.
 - Structural/independent refinement.

Compositional verification techniques

∞ Compositional verification [RBH+01]:

1. Prove properties of the components (for example, with model checking).
2. Combine components' properties to prove system's property without looking into the internals of the components (sometimes reduced to validity/satisfiability check for composition of properties).

∞ Formally:

$$\frac{\frac{S_1 \models P_1, S_2 \models P_2, \dots, S_n \models P_n}{\gamma_S(S_1, S_2, \dots, S_n) \models \gamma_P(P_1, P_2, \dots, P_n)} \quad \gamma_P(P_1, P_2, \dots, P_n) \models P}{\gamma_S(S_1, S_2, \dots, S_n) \models P}$$


∞ γ_P combines the properties depending on the connections used in γ_S

∞ E.g. synchronous case:

$$\gamma_P(P_1, P_2, \dots, P_n) = \rho_{\gamma_S}(P_1 \wedge P_2 \wedge \dots \wedge P_n)$$


where ρ_{γ_S} is the renaming of symbols defined by the connections in γ_S .

Contract-based approach



1. Step-wise refinement of components.
2. Compositional verification.
3. Proper reuse of components.

Main ingredients



Support to contracts: a
temporal logic approach.


Second Part:

Infinite-state model checking

A tutorial on property-based and contract-based
design of system architectures

Model checking

- Problem of checking if a system satisfies a property [CGP99].
- Algorithmic procedure to analyze Reactive Systems
 - systems with infinite behaviors
 - hardware, communication protocols, operating systems, controllers
- 30 years old
- Turing Award 2007 (Clarke, Emerson, and Sifakis).
- Tremendous Impact:
 - Routinely applied in hardware design.
 - Increasing use in the design of embedded systems.
 - Ideal for model-based system engineering.




Symbolic representation

- Symbolic **variables** $V = \{v_1, \dots, v_n\}$ to represent the state space.
- Symbolic **formulas** used to represent:
 - Set of states: $\phi(V) \equiv \{s \mid s \models \phi\}$
 - Set of transitions: $T(V, V') \equiv \{\langle s, s' \rangle \mid \langle s, s' \rangle \models \phi\}$
 - Where the variables $V' = \{v'_1, \dots, v'_n\}$ represent next state variables.
- A valuation $s: V \rightarrow D$ used to build a formula true for exactly that valuation.
 - $\langle x \leftarrow 1, y \leftarrow 1, z \leftarrow 5 \rangle$ we derive the formula $x=1 \wedge y=1 \wedge z=5$
- Each complete assignment can be considered a state
- A **transition system** is represented by:
 - The set of initial states represented by the formula $I(V)$
 - The transition relation represented by the formula $R(V, V')$

Symbolic algorithms

- Symbolic algorithms search the state space manipulating formulas.
- Main types of algorithms:
 - Based on fix-point:
 - Compute the pre/post-image of a set of states with quantifier elimination, e.g., $pre(\phi) := \exists V'(\phi \wedge T)$
 - Accumulate until at fix-point you get all reachable states.
 - Based on satisfiability:
 - Prove properties with a series of satisfiability checks ($sat(\phi)$ iff there exists s such that $s \models \phi$).
 - Based on abstraction:
 - E.g. predicate abstraction (partition states according to predicates).
 - Properties proved on abstract system hold also on the original system.



SAT-based algorithms

- ∞ Bounded Model Checking (BMC) [BCC+99]
 - Check $\text{sat}(\phi_k)$ where ϕ_k is sat iff there exists a path of M of length up to k violating the property P .
 - Focused on finding errors.
- ∞ Induction
 - Base case: check if the initial state satisfies P (invariant)
 - Inductive case: check if the transitions preserve the invariant.
- ∞ K-induction [SSS00]
 - Base case: check if all initial path satisfies P (invariant) up to k steps.
 - Inductive case: check if every path of $k + 1$ steps preserve the invariant.
- ∞ IC3 [Bra11]
 - Keeps sequence of relative inductive invariants (frames).
 - Use counterexamples to strengthen the frames.
- ∞ Also combined with abstraction:
 - Interpolation-based abstraction [McM03]
 - Unsat BMC used to over-approximate reachable states.
 - Implicit abstraction [Ton09]
 - SAT-based algorithms on abstract state space (without computing explicitly it).

From SAT to SMT

- Previous algorithms assume to have a solver for the satisfiability of formulas.
- First developed for finite-state systems with the support of SAT solvers.
- Satisfiability Modulo Theory (SMT):
 - Satisfiability for decidable fragments of first-order logic.
 - SAT solver used to enumerate Boolean models.
 - Integrated with decision procedure for specific theories, e.g., theory of real linear arithmetic.
- SAT solvers substituted by SMT solvers.
- Search algorithms applied to infinite-state systems (although in general undecidable).

SMT-based hybrid systems

- Hybrid systems encoded into symbolic transition systems with SMT constraints [CMT11,CMT13].
- Reals used to represent time and continuous variables.
- Transitions are either
 - Discrete: time does not change, state variables change according to transition relation $\phi(V, V')$
 - Timed: time elapses, discrete variables do not change, continuous variables evolve according to the flow law
 - E.g., the flow condition $\dot{x} < a$ is encoded into $x' - x < a(t' - t)$ where t is the time variable.

Third Part:


Property specification languages

A tutorial on property-based and contract-based
design of system architectures

Properties

- ✎ **Properties** are expressions in a mathematical logic using symbols of the system description.
- ✎ Used to formalize requirements.
- ✎ Also defined as assertions on the system's behavior.
- ✎ Problems:
 - Analysis: find the properties of a system.
 - Verification: check if the system satisfies the properties.
 - Validation: check if we are considering the right properties.
 - Synthesis: construct a system that satisfies the properties.

Properties, traces, and logic



Linear Temporal Logic

∞ Conceived by Pnueli in 1977 [Pnu77]

∞ Linear models

- State sequences (traces).





∞ Built over set of atomic propositions AP.

∞ LTL formulas are the smallest set of formulas such that:

- any atomic proposition p AP is an LTL formula;
- if p and q are LTL formulas, then $\neg p$, $p \wedge q$, $p \vee q$ are LTL formulas;
- if p and q are LTL formulas, then $X p$, $G p$, $F p$, and $[p U q]$ are LTL formulas.

∞ Semantics defined for every trace, for every $i \in \mathbb{N}$.

∞ $M \models \phi$ iff $M, \sigma, 0 \models \phi$ for every trace σ of M .



LTl examples

- ⌘ Gp “always p ” – invariant
- ⌘ $G(p \rightarrow Fq)$ “ p is always followed by q ” - reaction
- ⌘ $G(p \rightarrow Xq)$ “whenever p holds, q is set to true” – immediate reaction
- ⌘ GFp “infinitely many times p ” – fairness
- ⌘ FGp “eventually permanently p ”
- ⌘ $G(p \rightarrow (qUr))$

Simple entailment example

- ⌞ $G(\text{request} \rightarrow F(\text{received}))$
 - ⌞ $G(\text{received} \rightarrow F(\text{processed}))$
 - ⌞ $G(\text{processed} \rightarrow X(\text{grant}))$
- From which we can entail
- ⌞ $G(\text{request} \rightarrow F(\text{grant}))$

Past operators

∞ Past operators

- $Y\phi$, in the previous state ϕ , dual of X
- $O\phi$, in the past once ϕ , dual of F
- $H\phi$, in the past always ϕ , dual of G
- $\phi_1 S \phi_2$, in the past ϕ_1 since ϕ_2 , dual of U

Regular expressions

∞ RELTL enriches LTL with regular expressions:

- Suffix implication: $\{r\} \mid\rightarrow \phi$ means that every finite sequence matching r is followed by a suffix satisfying ϕ .
- Suffix conjunction: $\{r\} \diamond\rightarrow \phi$ means that there exists a finite sequence matching r and followed by a suffix satisfying ϕ .

∞ Example:

- $\{\{\{\neg p\}[*]; p\}[*\ 3]\} \rightarrow Fq$
- $G(\{request; busy[*]; grant\} \rightarrow response)$

Property specification language


- ⌘ Rich language to specify assertions on hardware design.
- ⌘ Include RELTL.
- ⌘ Increase usability with
 - Syntactic sugar
 - English words instead of math symbols:
 - “always” (G)
 - “never” ($G \neg$)
 - “eventually” (F)
 - “next” (X)

From finite to infinite

- ∞ Use first-order predicates instead of propositions:
 - $G(x \geq a \wedge x \leq b)$
 - $GF(x = a) \wedge GF(x = b)$
- ∞ Predicates interpreted according to specific theory T (henceforth, only used reals).
- ∞ “next” to express changes/transitions:
 - $G(next(x) = x + 1)$
 - $G(next(a) - a \leq b)$


Metric Temporal Logic

- ⌘ $G(p \rightarrow F_{\leq 3} q)$ “p is followed by q within 3 time units”
- ⌘ $G(p \rightarrow G_{\leq 2} q)$ “Whenever p holds, q holds in the following two time units”
- ⌘ $G(p \rightarrow (\neg q U_{\geq 1} q))$ “p is followed by q but only after 1 time unit”



Hybrid RELTL (HRELT)

- ⌘ $G(\text{der}(x) < 2)$ “The derivative of x is always less than 2”
- ⌘ $G(a \rightarrow \text{der}(x) = 0)$ “Whenever a holds, the derivative of x is zero”
- ⌘ $G(a \rightarrow (b U \text{der}(x) \leq 5))$ “Whenever a holds, b remain true until the derivative of x is less or equal to 5”.



Othello

- ∞ Human-readable language for HRELT.
- ∞ Controlled natural language expressions. Examples:
 - “always” (G)
 - “in the future” (F)
 - “and” (\wedge)
- ∞ Validated in the EuRailCheck project focus on the formalization and validation of ETCS requirements.
 - Example: “The train trip shall issue an emergency brake command, which shall not be revoked until the train has reached standstill and the driver has acknowledged the trip.”
 - Formalized into: “always (train_trip implies (emergency_brake_command until (der(train_location)=0 and driver_acknowledges_trip)))”

Fourth Part:


Contract-based design with temporal logics

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Component


- ∞ A component has
 - A syntactic interface
 - Optionally, an internal structure.
 - A behavior.
 - An environment.
 - Properties.

Black-box component interface



- ∞ A component interface defines boundary of the interaction between the component and its environment.
- ∞ Consists of:
 - Set of input and output **ports** (syntax)
 - Ports represent visible data and events exchanged with environment.
 - Set of **traces** (semantics)
 - Traces represent the behavior, history of events and values on data ports.

Glass-box component structure




∞ A component has an internal structure.

∞ **Architecture** view:

- Subcomponents
- Inter-connections
- Delegations

∞ **State-machine** view:

- Internal state
- Internal transitions
- Language over the ports



Component implementation

- ⌘ I_S : input ports of component S
- ⌘ O_S : output ports of S
- ⌘ $V_S = I_S \cup O_S$: all ports of S
- ⌘ $Tr(X)$ traces over $X \subseteq V_S$ (sequence of assignments to X)
- ⌘ State machine Imp implementation of S iff $L(Imp) \subseteq Tr(V_S)$
- ⌘ M can be associated with $\mu_{Imp}: Tr(I_S) \rightarrow 2^{Tr(O_S)}$ such that $\mu_{Imp}(\sigma_i) = \{\sigma_o \mid \sigma_i \times \sigma_o \in L(Imp)\}$
 - Input trace mapped to a set of output traces
 - “set” to consider non determinism
 - Empty set corresponds to rejected input trace

Component environment

- ⌘ State machine *Env* environment of *S* iff $L(Env) \subseteq Tr(I_S)$
- ⌘ Compatibility of implementation with environment (e.g., for reuse):
 - Trace-based (black-box) view:
 - *Imp* must accept any trace of *Env* (i.e., $L(Env) \subseteq \{ \sigma \mid \mu_{Imp}(\sigma) \neq \emptyset \}$)
 - State-based (glass-box) view:
 - For any reachable state of $Imp \times Env$, for any input transition of *Env*, there exists a matching transition of *Imp*.
 - As in interface theory [AH01] (note that $Imp \times Env$ is a closed system).

Composite components and connections

- ⇒ Components are composed to create composite components.
 - ⇒ Different kind of compositions:
 - Synchronous,
 - Asynchronous,
 - Synchronizations:
 - Rendez-vous vs. buffered;
 - Pairwise, multicast, broadcast, multicast with a receiver
 - ⇒ Connections map (general rule of architecture languages):
 - Input ports of the composite component
 - Output ports of the subcomponents
- Into
- Output ports of the composite component
 - Input ports of the subcomponents.

System architecture


- ⌘ A component is actually a component type.
- ⌘ A system architecture is an instance of a composite component.
- ⌘ It defines a tree of component instances.

Contracts

- ⌘ Properties of the component and its environment.
- ⌘ Can be seen as assertion for component interfaces.
- ⌘ Contracts used to characterize the correctness of component implementations and environments.
- ⌘ Typically, properties for model checking have a “god” view of the system internals.
- ⌘ For components instead:
 - Limited to component interfaces.
 - Structure into assumptions and guarantees.
- ⌘ Contracts for OO programming are pre-/post-conditions [Meyer, 82].
- ⌘ For systems, assumptions correspond to pre-conditions, guarantees correspond to post-conditions.

Trace-based contracts

- Assertions used to represent sets of traces over the component ports:
 - $\phi(V)$ assertion over variables V
 - $\langle\langle\phi\rangle\rangle \subseteq Tr(V)$ semantics of ϕ
- A contract of component S is a pair $\langle A, G \rangle$ of assertions over V_S
 - A is the assumption,
 - G is the guarantee.
- Env is a correct environment iff $L(Env) \subseteq \langle\langle A \rangle\rangle$
- Imp is a correct implementation iff $L(Imp) \cap \langle\langle A \rangle\rangle \subseteq \langle\langle G \rangle\rangle$




Example with Othello assertions:

```
assume:
  always (Pedal_Pos1 iff Pedal_Pos2)
guarantee:
  always ( (Pedal_Pos1 or Pedal_Pos2)
    implies (time_until(Brake_Line) <= 10 ));
```

Trace-based contract refinement

- ∞ The set of contracts $\{C_i\}$ **refines** C with the connection γ ($\{C_i\} \leqslant_\gamma C$) iff for all correct implementations Imp_i of C_i and correct environment Env of C :
 1. The composition of $\{Imp_i\}$ is a correct implementation of C .
 2. For all k , the composition of Env and $\{Imp_i\}_{i \neq k}$ is a correct environment of C_k .
- ∞ Verification problem:
 - check if a given refinement is correct (independently from implementations).



Proof obligations for contract refinement

Given $C_1 = \langle \alpha_1, \beta_1 \rangle, \dots, C_n = \langle \alpha_n, \beta_n \rangle, C = \langle \alpha, \beta \rangle$

Proof obligations for $\{C_i\} \leqslant C$:

- $\gamma \left(\left(\bigwedge_{1 \leq j \leq n} (\alpha_j \rightarrow \beta_j) \right) \rightarrow (\alpha \rightarrow \beta) \right)$
- $\gamma \left(\left(\bigwedge_{2 \leq j \leq n} (\alpha_j \rightarrow \beta_j) \right) \rightarrow (\alpha \rightarrow \alpha_1) \right)$
- ...
- $\gamma \left(\left(\bigwedge_{1 \leq j \leq n, j \neq i} (\alpha_j \rightarrow \beta_j) \right) \rightarrow (\alpha \rightarrow \alpha_i) \right)$
- ...
- $\gamma \left(\left(\bigwedge_{1 \leq j \leq n-1} (\alpha_j \rightarrow \beta_j) \right) \rightarrow (\alpha \rightarrow \alpha_n) \right)$

Theorem: $\{C_i\} \leqslant_\gamma C$ iff the proof obligations are valid. [CT12]

Weak vs. strong assumptions

∞ Weak vs. strong assumptions (both important):

- Weak assumptions
 - Define the context in which the guarantee is ensured
 - As in assume-guarantee reasoning
 - Different assume-guarantee pairs may have inconsistent assumptions (if $x > 0$ then ..., if $x < 0$ then ...)
- Strong assumptions
 - Define properties that must be satisfied by the environment.
 - Original idea of contract-based design.
 - If not satisfied, the environment can cause a failure (division by zero, out of power, collision).

Assume-guarantee reasoning

- ✎ Correspond to one direction of the contract refinement.
- ✎ Many works focused on finding the right assumption/guarantee.
- ✎ E.g. how to break circularity?
 - $(G(A \rightarrow B) \wedge G(B \rightarrow A)) \Rightarrow G(A \wedge B)$ is false
 - Induction-based mechanisms
 - $(B \wedge G(A \rightarrow XB) \wedge A \wedge G(B \rightarrow XA)) \Rightarrow G(A \wedge B)$ is true
- ✎ Note they are structural ways to prove the property-based refinement.

Fifth Part:

OCRA tool support

A tutorial on property-based and contract-based
design of system architectures

OCRA tool support

- ⇒ OCRA=Othello Contract Refinement Analysis [CDT13]
- ⇒ Contracts' assertions specified in Othello.
- ⇒ Textual representation of the architecture.
- ⇒ Built on top of nuXmv for infinite-state model checking.
- ⇒ Integrated with CASE tools:
 - AutoFocus3
 - Developed by Fortiss.
 - For synchronous system architectures.
 - CHESS
 - Developed by Intecs.
 - For SysML and UML modeling.
- ⇒ One of the few tools supporting contract-based design for embedded systems.
- ⇒ Publicly available (for non-commercial purposes) at <https://es.fbk.eu/tools/ocra>

OCRA main features

- ✧ Rich component interfaces to specify:
 - Input/output ports
 - Data/Event ports.
 - Including real-time and safety aspects.
- ✧ Contracts in temporal logics.
- ✧ Temporal formulas used to characterize set of traces over the ports of components.

OCRA language

COMPONENT system

...

COMPONENT A

...

COMPONENT B

...

Component interface

COMPONENT system

INTERFACE

INPUT PORT x: continuous;

OUTPUT PORT a: boolean;

...

REFINEMENT

...

COMPONENT A

...

COMPONENT B

...

Othello contracts

COMPONENT simple system

INTERFACE

INPUT PORT x: continuous;

OUTPUT PORT v: boolean;

CONTRACT v_correct

assume: always $x \geq 0$;

guarantee: always $(x = 0 \text{ implies } v)$;

REFINEMENT

...

COMPONENT A

...

COMPONENT B

...

Component refinement

COMPONENT simple system

INTERFACE

INPUT PORT x: continuous;

OUTPUT PORT v: boolean;

CONTRACT v_correct

assume: always $x \geq 0$;

guarantee: always $(x = 0 \text{ implies } v)$;

REFINEMENT

SUB a: A;

SUB b: B;

CONNECTION a.x := x;

CONNECTION b.y := a.v;

CONNECTION v := b.v;

...

Contract refinement

COMPONENT simple system

INTERFACE

INPUT PORT x: continuous;

OUTPUT PORT v: boolean;

CONTRACT v_correct

assume: always $x \geq 0$;

guarantee: always $(x = 0 \text{ implies } v)$;

REFINEMENT

SUB a: A;

SUB b: B;


CONNECTION a.x := x;

CONNECTION b.vi := a.v;

CONNECTION v := b.vo;

CONTRACT v_correct REFINEDBY a.v_correct, b.pass;

Complete example



simple.oss

OCRA temporal operator

∞ LTL operators with the following syntax:

- “always” G
- “in the future” F
- “until” U
- “then” X
- “historically” H
- “in the past” O
- “since” S
- “previously” Y

OCRA hybrid aspects

∞ Port types are either

- NuSMV types: “boolean”, enumeratives, ...
- nuXmv additional types: “real”, “integer”, ...
- “continuous”, i.e. real-value ports evolving continuously in time.
- “event”, i.e. boolean-value port that is assigned only on discrete transitions.

∞ Atomic formulas may be:

- Boolean variables.
- Equalities.
- Arithmetic predicates over integer, real, and continuous terms.

OCRA hybrid aspects

Special function symbols:

- “der” denoting the derivative of a continuous variable (e.g., “der(x)=0”).
- “next” denoting the next value after a discrete change (e.g. “next(x)=x+1”).
- “time_until” used to express constraints on the time to the next occurrence of an event:
 - “time_until(e)<=2” means $(\neg e)U_{\leq 2}e$

Syntactic sugar:

- fall(x) means “x=true and next(x)=false”
- rise(x) means “x=false and next(x)=true”
- change(x) means “next(x)≠x”

Important warning:

- The time model is hybrid with continuous evolution.
- What does “next” mean when time elapses?
- In OCRA/Othello/HRELT, “next” forces a discrete step:
 - “always ((der(timer)=1) and (timer=timeout implies next(timer)=0))”

Commands

- ⇒ `ocra_check_syntax`
- ⇒ `ocra_check_refinement`
- ⇒ `ocra_check_consistency`
- ⇒ `ocra_check_implementation`
- ⇒ `ocra_check_receptiveness`

- ⇒ Typical script:
 - `set verbose_level 1`
 - `set on_failure_script_quits 1`
 - `set pp_list cpp`
 - `ocra_check_syntax -i SenseSpacecraftRate.oss`
 - `ocra_check_refinement`
 - `quit`

- ⇒ Call: `ocra -source SenseSpacecraftRate.cmd`


Discrete vs. hybrid

- ✧ OCRA is parametrized by the logic.
- ✧ The expressions can be restricted and interpreted as discrete-time LTL or hybrid LTL.
- ✧ Default is hybrid.
- ✧ Set discrete-time to switch to LTL.

Contract refinement results


- ⌘ For every component, for every refined contract, check refinement.
- ⌘ For every proof obligation, check its validity:
 - [OK] if valid
 - [BOUND OK] if no counterexample found up to k
 - [FAIL] if found counterexample

SenseSpacecraftRate Example



SenseSpacecraftRate.oss

Considering failures



SenseSpacecraftRate_singlefailure.oss

Plugin for AutoFocus

The screenshot displays the AutoFocus plugin interface, which is divided into several panes. The top pane shows a component architecture diagram with a BSCU component connected to a Hydraulic component. The BSCU component has inputs for Pedal_Pos1, bscu1_fault_command, bscu1_fault_monitor, pedal_pos2, bscu2_fault_command, and bscu2_fault_monitor. It has outputs for CMD_AS and valid. The Hydraulic component has an input for valid and an output for Brake_Line.

The left pane shows the Model Navigator and Contract Navigator. The Model Navigator lists the project structure, including AF3-ProjectDemo, CriticalValueMonitor, InvertedPendulum, SenseSpacecraftRate, WBS, and Component Architecture Root. The Contract Navigator shows the contracts for the BSCU component, including OR, Select_Switch, subBSCU1, subBSCU2, Hydraulic, and State Automaton.

The right pane shows the Modeling pane, which includes a type filter text field and a list of modeling elements: Analysis, TL Specification, Component Archt, Component, Input, Output, Code Specificat, Mode Automaton, Mode Switch Sp, Operator Panel, Operator Panel, Refinement, Refinement Spec, and Safety.

The bottom pane shows the Contract Refinement view, which displays the contract for the brake_time property. The contract is defined as follows:

```
CONTRACT brake_time
assume:
  always (Pedal_Pos1=Pedal_Pos2) and
  .. no double fault
  (always ( (not bscu1_fault_Monitor) and
    (not bscu1_fault_Command) and
    (not bscu2_fault_Monitor) ) or
    always ( (not bscu1_fault_Monitor) and
    (not bscu1_fault_Command) and
    (not bscu2_fault_Command) ) or
    always ( (not bscu1_fault_Monitor) and
    (not bscu2_fault_Command) and
    (not bscu2_fault_Monitor) ) or
    always ( (not bscu1_fault_Command) and
    (not bscu2_fault_Command) and
    (not bscu2_fault_Monitor) ) );
guarantee:
  always ( (change(Pedal_Pos1) or change(Pedal_Pos2)) implies
    (in the future change(Brake_Line)) );
```

The bottom pane also includes a table for Model Markers, which shows the severity and explanation of errors and warnings.

Severity	Element	Explanation
ERROR		
WARNING		

Summary

- ✎ Contract-based design powerful
 - For property refinement
 - Safety analysis
- ✎ Temporal logic is suitable for component contracts.
- ✎ Contract framework parametrized by the logic.
- ✎ SMT-based model checking used to reason with expressive properties.
- ✎ OCRA tool support.

Related work

- ⌘ Basic concepts on contract-based design for embedded systems:
 - Albert Benveniste, Benoît Caillaud, Alberto Ferrari, Leonardo Mangeruca, Roberto Passerone, and Christos Sofronis. Multiple Viewpoint Contract-Based Specification and Design. *FMCO 2007*.
 - Manfred Broy: Towards a Theory of Architectural Contracts: - Schemes and Patterns of Assumption/Promise Based System Specification. *Software and Systems Safety - Specification and Verification 2011*: 33-87
 - Alberto Sangiovanni-Vincentelli, Werner Damm and Roberto Passerone. Taming Dr. Frankenstein: Contract-Based Design for Cyber-Physical Systems. *European Journal of Control*, 18(3):217-238, 2012.
 - Albert Benveniste, Benoît Caillaud, Dejan Nickovic, Roberto Passerone, Jean-Baptiste Raclet, Philipp Reinkemeier, Alberto L. Sangiovanni-Vincentelli, Werner Damm, Thomas A. Henzinger, and Kim G. Larsen. Contracts for Systems Design. Rapport de recherche RR-8147, INRIA, Nov. 2012.
- ⌘ META program and AGREE tool by Cofer and colleagues.
 - Also on system architecture with temporal logics for assume-guarantee reasoning.

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- 80 [CMT11] A. Cimatti, S. Mover, S. Tonetta, *HyDI: A Language for Symbolic Hybrid Systems with Discrete Interaction*. EUROMICRO-SEAA 2011: 275-278.
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- 80 [CT12] A. Cimatti, S. Tonetta, *A Property-Based Proof System for Contract-Based Design*. EUROMICRO-SEAA 2012: 21-28.
- 80 [CDT13] A. Cimatti, M. Dorigatti, S. Tonetta. *OCRA: A Tool for Checking the Refinement of Temporal Contracts*. ASE 2013.